ABSTRACT: Alan Gewirth's Reason and Morality justifies certain fundamental moral principles and develops morality out of the basic structure of action. Contemporary literature exposes a critical flaw in the second stage of Gewirth's argument contending that Gewirth fails to create agent-neutral moral claims. In order to provide a transfer of interests between agents, the solution to Gewirth's problem, I argue that certain Rawlsian concepts buttress and are consistent with Gewirth's argument for the normative structure of action.
In an attempt to defend the existence of moral rules, we should look to Alan Gewirth's Reason and Morality.
1 Gewirth's argument that action has an essential normative structure provides an argument for morality which surpasses other ethical doctrines. Even if one's moral intuitions disagree with Gewirth's moral theory, one is found, according to Gewirth's argument, in a logical contradiction. To defend Gewirth's argument and the ontological existence of morality, I shall address the criticism of Gewirth recently raised by Vaughn Huckfeldt. This project shall engage Gewirth's position, evaluate Huckfeldt's critique, and then show how Rawls' thought experiments can be used to defend Gewirth's supreme principle of morality.
Gewirth discusses the purposive nature of actions to introduce the normative structure of action. Gewirth highlights how agents act towards some goal or end. The purpose of acting or achieving that goal constitutes a reason for action. For example, if I desire a sip of soda pop, I connect that purpose with a specific action, such as moving the can to my mouth for a drink. Gewirth then connects an action's purpose to values. Gewirth writes, " [T] he agent necessarily regards his purposes as good and hence makes an implicit value judgment about them." 2 When looking at any purpose, even one as simple as taking a drink, the reason one acts is because he/she views his/her goals, such as quenching thirst, as good in some respect.
Gewirth then formulates his supreme principle of morality with three main steps. The first step evaluates the goodness of one's purposes and the necessary goodness of what helps one act on those purposes: free-dom and well-being. The second step transforms evaluative judgments about the necessary goods into deontic judgments forcing one to make right claims to freedom and well-being. The third step shows both how every agent must claim certain rights and how every agent must logically accept that "all prospective purposive agents have rights to freedom and well-being." 3 These steps will be the blueprint for providing further details to Gewirth's argument for absolute rights.
The first concept of Gewirth's to unpack is his dialectically neces- As one reflects on using the D.N.M., the agent would discover certain necessary goods needed for any agent to act on any purpose. Gewirth argues that because we necessarily see our purposes as good, we must then see how freedom and well-being, both required for acting, are necessary goods. 6 Freedom is the procedural aspect of action as it allows agents to act on the purposes he/she views as good.
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When looking at the possibility of taking a drink, I would need to have the freedom to be able to move around, as opposed to being tied in a chair, to get that beverage. Well-being is the substantial aspect of action which provides one with the ability to perform actions to achieve his/her goals. 8 When I attempt to take a sip of soda pop, I need to be able-bodied to such a degree that I can physically achieve my goal.
After establishing these two necessary goods through the D.N.M.,
Gewirth enters the second stage of his argument: turning the generic goods of freedom and well-being into generic rights for an agent. Gewirth opens his argument with the following question: "If he regards these conditions as indeed necessary for the very possibility of his agency and for his chances of succeeding in his actions, then must he not hold that all other persons ought at least to refrain from interfering with the conditions?" 9 Not only would rights be important for acting on one's purposes, but also rights would be in place to defend the value of the necessary goods. As freedom and well-being are necessary goods, Gewirth contends agents must believe that others should not interfere with the agent's own freedom and wellbeing. In other words, the agent is logically committed in claiming a right to freedom and well-being.
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Gewirth then gives his most explicit argument for why each agent must claim rights to freedom and well-being or else be caught in contradiction:
Suppose some agent were to deny or refuse to accept the judgment (1) 'I have rights to freedom and well-being.' Because of the equivalence between generic rights and strict 'ought,' this denial of (1) would entail the agent's denial of (2) 'All other persons ought at least to refrain from interfering with my freedom and well-being.' By denying (2), the agent would have to accept (3) 'It is not the case that all other persons ought at least refrain from interfering with my freedom and well-being.' But how can any agent accept (3) and also accept (4) 'My freedom and well-being are necessary goods'? That he must accept (4) we saw above; for by virtue of regarding his purposes as good the agent must also a fortiori value his freedom and well-being as required for achieving any of his purposes…. He must therefore accept, on pain of contradiction, that he has generic rights.
At this point in his theory, Gewirth has made a formal argument that because one must value freedom and well-being, one must accept he/she has certain generic rights with which others ought not to interfere.
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In step three, Gewirth logically forces an agent into accepting similar right claims for all agents. Gewirth argues, "Now whatever the description under which or the sufficient reason for which it is claimed that a person has some right, the claimant must admit, on pain of contradiction, that this right also belongs to any other person to whom that description or sufficient reason applies." 12 Gewirth uses the basic principle of universality of reasons to extend right claims to all agents. Gewirth now thinks he has justified that all agents must acknowledge that everyone has rights to freedom and well-being, the normative basis of morality.
Huckfeldt's critique of Gewirth can now be examined. Huckfeldt firsts identifies the area with Gewirth's argument where he discovers a problem. Huckfeldt claims that the success of the argument depends on "whether or not the necessary reason to pursue freedom and well-being require me to make agent-neutral claims (i.e. rights claims 
